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I. INTRODUCTION
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently created a new era of privacy
law in this state in Singleton v. State.' In Singleton the South Carolina
Supreme Court recognized a substantive right of privacy in article I, section
10 of the South Carolina Constitution,2 which states, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated. . . .-3 The court
*. B.A. 1991, Old Dominion University; J.D. 1994, University of South Carolina. The
author wishes to thank Professor William S. McAninch for his invaluable comments on earlier
drafts.
1. _ S.C. 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993).
2. See id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 61.
3. S.C. Const. art. I, § 10.
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held that the State violates this right of privacy by forcibly medicating a
convict, incompetent to be executed, solely to facilitate execution. Although
this privacy language has been in the Constitution for more than twenty
years,5 Singleton gives the language a new meaning - a meaning with
substantial jurisprudential implications and opportunities for South Carolina
citizens. This Note explores the ramifications of recognizing a substantive
right of privacy in the state constitution.
The right of an individual to be let alone has been recognized for more
than one hundred years.' An individual's freedom from the watchful eye of
Big Brother' is a freedom that most Americans probably take for granted.
Since the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court has struggled to strike a
balance between our private lives and the governmental power to impinge on
those lives in our best interests. The landmark decision of Griswold v.
Connecticut' gave the Supreme Court a vehicle by which it may protect
individuals from unwarranted governmental intrusions into their personal lives.
In Griswold the Court recognized a fundamental zone of privacy in the
penumbra of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.9 Thereafter,
courts struck down as unconstitutional state legislation that unduly interfered
with an individual's substantive right of privacy.
The federal courts have grappled with construing this constitutional right
to privacy ever since Griswold. Decisions in marriage,' 0 child-rearing, 1
4. Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 61.
5. See infra text accompanying note 70.
6. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890). Although it focuses upon an informational privacy right, this influential article arguably
is recognized as the cradle of the modem substantive right of privacy. See generally Jed
Rubenfeld, tie Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989) (distinguishing between
informational privacy and substantive privacy).
7. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1947).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut statute that forbade the use of
contraceptives because the substantive right of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights protects
the right of married persons to use contraceptives).
9. Id. at 484. Justice Harlan's concurrence suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause does not have to incorporate or depend upon the specific Bill of Rights
guarantees, but instead stands "on its own bottom" to protect values "'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'" Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)). In accord with Justice Harlan's opinion, the right to privacy found in Griswold
within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights has evolved into a substantive due process analysis, in
which the Supreme Court has found the right of privacy to be a part of the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the
right to privacy of the Fourteenth Amendment "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
10. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking down on privacy grounds a statute
that dictated that a parent who was under a court order to support a child could not marry if that
parent had not paid such support and could not demonstrate that the child would not become a
[Vol. 46:191
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child-bearing, 2 and the use of contraceptives 3 established the basic con-
tours of a federal right to privacy. However, in recent years the federal courts
limited their decisions upholding a person's autonomy over state interests.
14
Instead, under the notion of federalism federal courts deferred to the states to
protect an individual's privacy interests. At the same time, the federal courts
invited states to use their own constitutions to protect their citizens from
unwarranted government interference with privacy rights.' 5
The South Carolina Supreme Court used the state constitution's privacy
provision to protect a prisoner's right to be free from unwarranted forced
medication in Singleton. 6 Part I of this Note will detail this forced medica-
tion analysis as well as other significant aspects of the decision, in which the
supreme court also adopted a competency standard for convicts awaiting
execution and defined the scope of remedies available in post conviction relief
hearings. Part II explores the rationale and legitimacy of recognizing a
substantive right of privacy in the South Carolina Constitution. Part III
addresses the importance of developing a state constitutional right of privacy.
Of course, with this development will come a new responsibility for the state
courts. As the state judiciary bases its privacy decisions on the state
constitution, it enters an area of law that is virtually nonexistent in this state.
Therefore, the courts have a long, arduous task of providing textual and
public charge).
11. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Although this case did not rely on
the substantive right of privacy articulated in the subsequent Griswold decision, the Court held
that parents have a right to direct the education of their children by invalidating a state statute
requiring children to attend public schools.
12. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 113 (invalidating on right of privacy grounds a Texas
statute that almost completely banned abortions).
13. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down legislation that allowed
distribution of contraceptives only to physicians, pharmacists, and married persons).
14. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to establish a general protection
of adult consensual sexual activity). But see Washington v. Harper, 494 U:S. 210 (1990)
(recognizing that, absent an overriding state interest, a prisoner has a significant liberty interest
in not being forcibly medicated).
15. See William S. Graebe, Comment, The Right to Privacy: A Proposalfor North Carolina,
26 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 1185, 1186-87 & n. 13 (1991)("Mhe protection of a person's general
right to privacy ... is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual States." (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 ,U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967)
(alteration in original)); see also Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (stating that the decision not to expand
privacy rights did not affect "state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state constitutional
grounds"). Indeed, former Chief Judge Sanders of the South Carolina Court of Appeals strongly
urged litigants to raise the state constitution's right of privacy provision because of state courts'
ability to expand upon federal rights by interpreting the state constitution. See State v. Austin,
306 S.C. 9, 15-17, 409 S.E.2d 811, 815 (Ct. App. 1991). For a discussion on the importance
of federalism urged by Chief Judge Sanders in Austin, see infra part III.
16. See Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 61.
1994]
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theoretical interpretations of the state constitution's right of privacy. Finally,
Part IV will look at specific state constitutional challenges that may be made
to South Carolina state action under the privacy umbrella. For example, South
Carolina's statute mandating HIV testing of sex offenders may be challenged.
Also, the privacy provision may be instrumental in establishing a person's
privacy-based right to die.
Singleton created the possibility of a new attack on state action that
impinges on a citizen's right to privacy. The South Carolina courts may take
this opportunity to fill in the gaps involving certain privacy issues that federal
courts have chosen not to address or have construed narrowly. Accordingly,
we should remember that it is the state constitution we are expounding.17
II. SINGLETON V. STATE
Fred Singleton was convicted for murder, first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, larceny of a motor vehicle, and burglary. He then was sentenced to
be executed. 8 On a second application for post conviction relief (PCR) in
March 1990, "Singleton alleged that he was not competent to be executed."' 9
At the PCR hearing, in determining the proper standard to assess
Singleton's competency the judge adopted the American Bar Association
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard (A.B.A. Standard). 20 The State
urged the adoption of the standard Justice Powell set forth in his concurrence
in Ford v. Wainwright.21 However, the PCR judge found Singleton incompe-
tent to be executed under the A.B.A. Standard and Justice Powell's stan-
dard.2 -
Upon this finding of incompetency, the PCR judge vacated Singleton's
death sentence and imposed a life sentence on May 8, 1991. The State
appealed, claiming that the PCR judge adopted the wrong standard to assess
competency and erred in vacating the sentence. The supreme court then
addressed the State's forced medication of Singleton as a critical question
inherent in both of the raised issues.2'
17. Justice Marshall once remarked that one cannot expect the Constitution to have the detail
of a legal code because then the human mind could not embrace its fundamental premises: "[W]e
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
18. Singleton v. State, __ S.C. _, __, 437 S.E.2d 53, 54 (1993).
19. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 55.
20. Id. at _,437 S.E.2d at 55; see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
21. 477 U.S. 399, 418 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); see infra notes 29-31 and
accompanying text.
22. Singleton, _ S.C. at , 437 S.E.2d at 55.
23. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 55.
[Vol. 46:191
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A. The Competency Standard for Execution
On appeal the State contended that the PCR court erred by not adopting
Justice Powell's competency standard set forth in Ford v. Wainwright and by
instead adopting the A.B.A. Standard.24 The A.B.A. Standard consists of a
two-prong test:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness
or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the
pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the
punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also incompe-
tent if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict lacks
sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact which might exist
which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability
to convey such information to counsel or to the court.
z5
The court defined the first prong, "the cognitive prong," "as the ability to
recognize the nature of the punishment and the reason for the punishment. "26
The second prong, "the assistance prong," involves "the ability to assist
counsel, or the court, in identifying exculpatory or mitigating information.'27
A defendant's failure to satisfy either prong will warrant a stay of execu-
tion.
28
In Ford v. Wainwright the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth
Amendment grants an insane prisoner the right not to be executed.29
However, only Justice Powell's concurring opinion proposed a standard
addressing the meaning of insanity.3" Justice Powell stated, "I would hold
that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer
it."3" Justice Powell's articulation mirrors the cognitive prong of the A.B.A.
Standard. However, Justice Powell rejected the assistance prong of the
A.B.A. Standard in a footnote addressing the more rigorous standards used in
some states.32
24. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 55.
25. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-5.6(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n
Criminal Justice Standards Committee 1987).
26. Singleton, __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 55-56.
27. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 56.
28. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
29. 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
30. Id. at 421-22 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L REv. 100,
103-04 (1986) (summarizing Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Ford).
31. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring), (quoted in Singleton, _ S.C. at ,
437 S.E.2d at 56).
32. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell stated:
1994]
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In Singleton the court adopted a modified A.B.A. Standard. 33 Because
this standard entails two prongs with failure of either prong warranting a stay
of execution, the Singleton court embraced Justice Powell's cognitive standard
only as a federal constitutional minimum.34  In adopting the two-prong
standard, the court reviewed the development of the assistance prong in the
common law. 35 The court also pointed to the Washington Supreme Court's
recent adoption of a test similar to the A.B.A. Standard in Washington v.
Harris.36 The Singleton court recognized that the common law should remain
in effect unless the legislature acts,37 implicitly inviting the legislature to do
SO. 3  Therefore, with little South Carolina case authority to guide it, the
court adopted the two-prong analysis because it found that this test was firmly
rooted in English and American common law.39 However, the court slightly
modified the assistance prong to include a rational communication element
present in the Harris test.4° While the State could not execute Singleton if
he failed either prong of the test, the court found that he failed both tests and
that a stay of execution was warranted.4
I find no sound basis for constitutionalizing the broader definition of insanity, with
its requirement that the defendant be able to assist in his own defense. States are
obviously free to adopt a more expansive view of sanity in this context than the one
the Eighth Amendment imposes as a constitutional minimum.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring), quoted in Singleton,_ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 56.
33. Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
34. See id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 56 (citing Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1061 (1987)).
35. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 56-58 (citing e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
389 (1769)).
36. 789 P.2d 60, 65-66 (Wash. 1990) (en bane) (basing its competency test upon the common
law and not the Eighth Amendment).
37. Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 58 (citations omitted).
38. Cf. id. at _ n.2, 437 S.E.2d at 57 n.2 (noting that most states have statutorily adopted
the assistance prong).
39. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
40. The standard adopted by the South Carolina Supreme Court involves the following
analysis:
The first prong is the cognitive prong which can be defined as: whether a convicted
defendant can understand the nature of the proceedings, what he or she was tried for,
the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment. The second prong
is the assistance prong which can be defined as: whether the convicted defendant
possesses sufficient capacity or ability to rationally communicate with counsel.
Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
41. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 58.
[Vol. 46:191
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B. The PCR Remedy of Vacating a Sentence
The State also argued that a PCR judge cannot vacate a capital sentence.
The State argued that, in effect, this remedy was a judicial commutation of the
sentence that violated article IV, section 14 of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion.42 The court rejected the contention that the PCR judge's order commut-
ed the death sentence.43 Instead, the court held that the granted relief was
beyond the scope of remedies available to a PCR court.'
The court delineated the proper procedure and remedy available to a PCR
court upon a finding of a convict's incompetency. The court instructed the
PCR judge to issue a temporary stay of Singleton's execution, subject to
mandatory review by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Once the stay is
affirmed, the State will have the burden of establishing a defendant's
subsequent return to competency by a preponderance of the evidence. If the
State meets this burden, the PCR court may lift the stay of execution, again
subject to review by the South Carolina Supreme Court.45
C. Forced Medication
The court next addressed the constitutionality of forcibly medicating
Singleton to render him competent for execution. The court referred to the
federal and state constitutions in discussing this question.46
Two United States Supreme Court decisions involving forced medication
established the required federal due process analysis. In Washington v.
Harper47 the Court found that a prisoner had a significant liberty interest in
avoiding the State's forced use of antipsychotic drugs.4" The State, however,
also had a significant interest in maintaining safety and security in its
prisons.49 Balancing these interests, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause permits the forced drug treatment of prisoners who have serious mental
42. Singleton, _ S.C. at , 437 S.E.2d at 58-59. The South Carolina Constitution
provides that "the Governor shall have the power.., to commute a sentence of death to that of
life imprisonment. The granting of all other clemency shall be regulated and provided for by
law." S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 14. The State also argued that § 17-25-370 of the South Carolina
Code precluded the remedy that the PCR court afforded Singleton because the statute provides
"that an execution must be carried out 'unless stayed by order of the Supreme Court or respite
or commutation of the Governor.'" Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-25-370 (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
43. Singleton, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 59.
44. Id. at 437 S.E.2d at 59-60.
45. Id. at 437 S.E.2d at 60.
46. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 60-61.
47. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
48. Id. at 221-22.
49. See id. at 225-26.
19941
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disabilities only when the prisoners present a danger to themselves or others,
and the treatment is medically appropriate.5"
In Riggins v. Nevada' a defendant who was given prescribed antipsy-
chotic drugs moved to terminate the medication for the trial.5 2 Because the
trial court denied this motion, the Supreme Court held that the continued
forced medication of the defendant during the trial violated due process unless
the State showed that the medication was medically appropriate, essential for
safety purposes and that no less intrusive means existed. 3
After summarizing these decisions, the South Carolina Supreme Court did
not resort to this required federal due process analysis in Singleton. Instead,
it turned to a state constitutional analysis, relying primarily upon Louisiana v.
Perry,54 a similar Louisiana case.
In Peny the Supreme Court of Louisiana addressed whether a State could
give a prisoner incompetent for execution antipsychotic drugs without his
consent. The trial court ordered the forced medication after finding the
prisoner incompetent without the drugs. On a writ of habeas corpus the
United States Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded the case in light
of Washington v. Harper. Subsequently, the trial court reinstated the order,
finding Washington v. Harper inapplicable to a determination of competency
for execution.55
On appeal the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to address the federal due
process question altogether because an adequate state constitutional ground
disposed of the case, removing any need for federal review.56 The state
ground involved the express guarantee of the right of privacy in the Louisiana
Constitution. 57  The Louisiana Constitution provides this right of privacy:
"Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. " 58 The court recognized that this language not only
50. Id. at 227.
51. __ U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
52. Id. at_, 112 S.Ct. at 1812-13.
53. Id.at -, 112 S.Ct. at 1815-17. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether
a competent defendant may refuse medication if the termination of the medication would render
the defendant incompetent to stand trial. Id. at __, 112 S.Ct. at 1815.
54. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
55. Id. at 748.
56. See Perry, 610 So.2d. at 751. For a discussion of the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine, see infra part IV.
57. See Perry, 610 So.2d at 755. The court had to distinguish Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990), which allowed forced medication in certain circumstances. The court reasoned
that forcing drugs to facilitate execution does not constitute medical treatment as discussed in
Harper and that the forced medication does not rationally further the medical interest of the
prisoner or the state's interest in safety. Perry, 610 So.2d at 751-52.
58. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
[Vol. 46:191
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affected search and seizure law, but also "incorporate[d] the principles of the
United States Supreme Court privacy decisions in explicit statement."
59
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the state constitution
provided a right to decide upon medical treatment, and forcing medication
upon a prisoner for execution infringed upon this right.'
The Singleton court noted the similarity between Louisiana's constitutional
section providing a substantive right of privacy and article I, section 10 of the
South Carolina Constitution, which states, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be
violated . "..."61 The court's analysis of this provision was cursory: "This
provision in the South Carolina Constitution is no less compelling than the
provision in the Louisiana Constitution. Moreover, when the provision is
weighed with the due process inquiry mandated by Harper, it becomes
apparent that the analysis followed by Louisiana is correct."62 Therefore, the
supreme court held that the State violates the right of privacy in the South
Carolina Constitution by forcibly medicating a convict solely to expedite
execution.63 Arguably, this holding represents the recognition of a substan-
tive right of privacy in the South Carolina Constitution.'
III. THE ORIGIN OF THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION
This Part will discuss the legitimacy of the judicial recognition of a
substantive right of privacy in the South Carolina Constitution. The possibility
59. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 756 (citing Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988)).
60. Id. at 757. Because the court rested its decision explicitly on the state constitution, the
decision was insulated from federal court review. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
(holding that the Supreme Court will not review a state court decision when the state court makes
it clear that the decision does not rest on federal grounds); see also infra notes 98-99 and
accompanying text.
61. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10.
62. Singleton, _ S.C. _, _, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (1993). The court also referred to the
ethical code of the American Medical Society and the American Psychiatric Associations, which
oppose participation of medical professionals in executions because administering the drug
responsible for death would violate a physician's Hippocratic oath. This ethical code reinforced
the prohibition of forced medication in Singleton. See id. at _, 437 S.E. 2d at 61.
63. See id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 61-62.
64. It should be noted that in 1991 the United States District Court for South Carolina
recognized an individual's right to privacy in S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. See Watson v. Medical
Univ. of S.C., No. 9:88-2844-18, 1991 WL 406979 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 1991), aff'd 974 F.2d 482
(4th Cir. 1992). This court held that, like the United States Constitution, the South Carolina
Constitution's right to privacy protected a blood donor's right to be free from a discovery request
for personal information concerning the donor. Id. at *5.
1994]
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of including this privacy right in the state constitution has not been specifically
discussed by commentators or the judiciary. As noted earlier, the Singleton
court did not discuss the origin or the purpose of the privacy provision other
than to say that the provision creates a right of privacy extending past search
and seizure cases. Instead, the court relied on the similarity between South
Carolina's and Louisiana's privacy provisions and adopted the reasoning of
Louisiana v. Perry. Ideally, the legitimacy of recognizing a substantive
privacy right should be examined in light of the legislative history of the
relevant clause and not the textual similarity of another state's constitution.
However, little legislative history exists to determine the drafters' intent for
article I, section 10. In some ways the existing history differs significantly
from Louisiana's history in its drafting of a privacy provision.
Louisiana added the privacy clause when drafting its present constitution
in 1974. At that time, Griswold v. Connecticut had articulated the concept of
a right of privacy that protects personal choices.' Therefore, as one
commentator pointed out, "[lit seems scarcely possible that the committee
members could have failed to appreciate the potential import of a state
constitutional right of 'privacy.' " The commentator also noted that specific
drafting history shows an intent to incorporate autonomous rights in the
privacy language.67 The Louisiana courts did not have occasion to consider
the breadth of the privacy provision as it relates to autonomous decisions until
1989. In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher8 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that included in a person's state constitutional right of privacy is the right to
reject or obtain medical treatment without government interference.69 This
holding allowed the court to extend the state privacy right to protect a
convict's right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment solely for execution
purposes in Louisiana v. Peny.70
The Committee to Make a Study of the Constitution drafted the present
privacy provision in the South Carolina Constitution during 1966-1969. The
General Assembly adopted the provision as amended in 1971 .71 Although the
Supreme Court decided Griswold six years before this amendment, the federal
65. John Devlin, Privacy andAbortion Rights Under the Louisiana State Constitution: Could
Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 LA. L. REV. 685, 691-95 (1991); see
id. at 694 n.31 (listing several federal court cases that had protected family privacy rights in
different contexts prior to 1974).
66. Id. at 700 (noting other evidence which demonstrates that the privacy issue was presented
explicitly).
67. Id. at 703.
68. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
69. Id. at 415.
70. See 610 So. 2d 746, 756-57 (La. 1992).
71. See S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10 (amending S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 16).
[Vol. 46:191
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courts had just begun to extend the contours of the decision into other
substantive areas of privacy.
Indeed, the existing legislative history does not even mention the Griswold
decision or suggest a privacy right in a person's autonomous sense. Instead,
the history demonstrates the drafters' concern with expanding the right of
privacy in the search and seizure arena because of the advent of computer data
technology and electronic surveillance.72 However, the history also indicates
the drafters' awareness of the possible expansion of the right of privacy. The
drafters specifically agreed that the privacy provision should fall upon the
courts to interpret, developing the case law necessary to effectuate the
provision in South Carolina.73 One committee member stated, "What our
goal is, is to insert into the Constitution that which would give an aggrieved
individual a cause for action if the authorities get out of hand in invasion of
privacy by whatever means."'" Another committee member supported the
use of more broad provisional language because "the court can take 'unreason-
able' and push it any way they want to do it .... [T]his is something that the
courts are going to write. "I
In Singleton the court expanded the right of privacy into a personal
choice, based on the similarity of South Carolina and Louisiana's privacy
provisions, without discussing the legislative history. A look at this history
may suggest that the drafters did not intend to expand the privacy scope in an
autonomous sense. The recorded minutes contain comments supporting the
broad privacy language; however, committee members made these comments
in discussions about electronic surveillance. Arguably, the committee
members supported the broad language only to address possible search and
72. See Committee to Make a Study of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, Minutes of
Committee Meeting 6 (Sept. 15, 1967) (unpublished minutes, on file with the University of South
Carolina School of Law Coleman Karesh Library) ("The committee agreed that [the search and
seizure provision] should remain, but that i[t] should be revised to take care of the invasion of
privacy through modem electronic devices."). Indeed, the drafters used the proposed Maryland
Constitution as a model: "The right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures and in their oral or other communications against unreasonable interceptions shall
not be violated." Id. at 7. However, the drafters voted to change the wording as it appears
today because interceptionseemed too confined to communications, whereas the words "invasions
of privacy" would also cover data processing banks and other technology then unknown to the
drafters. Minutes of the Committee to Make a Study of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895,
Minutes of Committee Meeting at 3-4 (Oct. 6, 1967) (unpublished minutes, on file with the
University of South Carolina School of Law Coleman Karesh Library).
73. Id. at 5. ("[W]e are going to have to revert back to a phrase, 'against unreasonable
invasions of privacy' and rely upon the court to develop a history just as it has upon the
unreasonable search of your house.") (statement of Robert H. Stoudemire).
74. Id. (statement of W.D. Workman, Jr.).
75. Id. at 6 (statement of Huger Sinkler). Mr. Sinkler went on to say, "I think this is an area
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seizure privacy situations implicated by new technology, not to expand the
right of privacy into other substantive areas, such as forced medication of
prisoners.76
However, the language adopted is broad enough not to be limited to
search and seizure issues. The drafters' reasoning for selecting this language
may justify the court's expansion of the South Carolina Constitution's right of
privacy. Although perhaps not even considered by the drafters, this expansion
is necessary and proper to protect the citizens of the state against unreasonable
governmental intrusion into their private lives.
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
IN A STATE CONSTITUTION: INDEPENDENT
AND ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS
A state court that uses its own constitution to invalidate government action
at the same time insulates its decision from federal review by virtue of the
independent and adequate state ground doctrine. This section will examine the
underlying rationale and the importance of this doctrine.
A. Federalism
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine rests upon the
concept of federalism as embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.7 7 A state's inherent sovereignty designates the
state courts as ultimate authorities for interpretation of state law,78 as long as
their interpretations do not conflict with or infringe upon any federally
guaranteed rights.7 9 Federal authority also will act when an area of law is
based on a strong national policy, requiring consistency among the states to
carry out that national policy in a uniform manner. Therefore, federalism
offers individuals a "double security" of their rights.80
76. Article I, § 10 supports this view because the drafters also added that a warrant shall not
issue without particularly describing "the information to be obtained." S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
This language demonstrates the possible limitation of the privacy provision to only search and
seizure situations involving electronic surveillance.
77. See U.S. CONST. amends. IX-X.
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988) (allowing Supreme Court review of final judgments rendered
by state courts on writ of certiorari only if the decision draws into question its validity on the
ground that it is repugnant to the United States Constitution or federal laws); Murdock v. City
of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874) (establishing that the Supreme Court will not review
state decisions independently and adequately based on state law).
79. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States.
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
80. James Madison described the federalist system as follows:
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As the ultimate interpreter of the state constitution, the state court should
be the primary protector of its citizens' individual rights.8 ' The states have
not always been active in this role, however. For a period during the 1960s
and 1970s, the United States Supreme Court intervened in states' affairs to
expand "protection of individual privacy rights against unreasonable state
regulations,"82 particularly in criminal and family privacy. 3  This federal
activism restrained state involvement in privacy decisions because federal
supremacy precluded the states from asserting state grounds that conflicted
with federal decisions. However, in the 1980s the federal expansion into the
protection of privacy rights diminished.' The federal courts again are
leaving the state courts to assume the role of primary protectors of individual
rights." As the federal courts refuse to address a privacy issue or construe
an issue too narrowly, the states can assert independent and adequate state
grounds for protection of their citizens. Therefore, the recognition of a
substantive right of privacy in a state constitution becomes more imperative.
B. The Importance of Independent and Adequate State Grounds
If a court rests its decision on a state constitutional right to privacy, the
decision has important consequences, not only for the state citizens, but also
for the concept of federalism as a whole. First, the state can offer its citizens
more rights than the United States Constitution can offer. While the
Supremacy Clause subordinates state constitutional law to federal constitutional
interpretations,8 6 the state may provide additional rights beyond the rights
required by the federal Constitution if those rights do not conflict with federal
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion
allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence
a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different govern-
ments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled
by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 357 (James Madison) (Benjamin Wright ed., 1961).
81. See Graebe, supra note 15, at 1194.
82. Id. at 1195 (footnote omitted).
83. For a list of Supreme Court decisions demonstrating its activism in guaranteeing individual
privacy rights in marriage, procreation, and family during this era, see id. at nn.23-55 and
accompanying text.
84. Id. at 1195; see also supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
85. See Graebe, supra note 15, at 1195; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (applauding state court
activism in extending civil liberty rights to citizens via state constitutions); William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986) (approving the trend of state courts stepping
into the breach left by the contraction of the scope of federal rights).
86. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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law.87 The state's ability to articulate and vindicate an individual's funda-
mental interests becomes even more important when the Supreme Court
construes individual rights too narrowly or not at all.88
In Singleton, for example, the, state court granted a convict a right to be
free from forced medication used to facilitate execution.89 This right goes
beyond any federal interpretation of the substantive right to privacy because
the Supreme Court has not ruled on this specific situation. However, on the
basis of federalism, the state court could provide Singleton with independent
protection. ' Had the state court not relied on the state right of privacy and
used only the federal due process analysis set forth in Washington v. Harper
and Riggins v. Nevada,91 the decision then would be subject to federal review
because it would not rest on independent and adequate state grounds. This
federal substantive analysis could have limited Singleton's right to make a
personal choice of whether to be medically treated.
The independent and adequate state ground doctrine may provide
individuals with greater fundamental rights, as well as benefit the individual
because, arguably, state judges have better insight into what the state's citizens
87. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Devlin, supra note 65, at 686. An
example of a state affording its citizens greater protection than that afforded by the federal
constitution occurred in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aft'd,
447 U.S. 74(1980). In Robins the California Supreme Court invoked the state constitution's free
speech guarantee to require private shopping mall owners to grant access to otherwise orderly
persons soliciting petition signatures. Id. at 347. Although the United States Supreme Court
previously held that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution does not protect free
speech activity in private malls, see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), the
California Supreme Court could grant its citizens greater freedom of speech rights than are
granted under the United States Constitution.
88. Justice Utter of the Washington Supreme Court has suggested that attorneys who fail to
raise state constitutional challenges as protection for their clients may be close to committing
malpractice. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State ConstitutionalArgument:
Comment on Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REv. 635, 640 (1987) (footnote omitted).
Indeed, failure to raise valid constitutional challenges deprives a client of the double security the
founding fathers intended to create through federalism. Id. at 643; see supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
89. See discussion supra part I.C.
90. The court had to explicitly state that its decision rested on state grounds to preclude
federal review. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. It is not enough for a court to say that a
right exists without a sound textual and theoretical approach supporting an extension of privacy
rights. Therefore, because state constitutional law has developed more slowly, to a great extent
litigants must rely on federal law where a federal analog to a particular right of privacy exists.
See Graebe, supra note 15, at 1205 (discussing the necessity of state courts using federal
precedent to establish a sound basis for privacy decisions, which in turn would develop stable
state privacy precedents); see also Utter & Pitler, supra note 88, at 644-45 (explaining the
inherent tension created by the supremacy clause and federal constitutional minimum standards
when a state court relies on federal precedent to support state constitutional arguments).
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expect their rights of privacy to include. South Carolina judges may be better
able to define which South Carolinians' privacy concerns the state constitution
should protect.' Of course, the judiciary may be open to criticism that it is
acting as a superlegislature, violating the separation of powers doctrine within
the state. However, perhaps it is better for the courts to endure such criticism
than for South Carolina citizens' right of privacy to be defined by only an
occasional federal decision.
In addition to granting individuals greater fundamental rights under the
state constitution, the court promotes federalism by using an independent and
adequate state ground for its privacy decisions. As noted above, the state
court is the final interpreter of state rights, and the federal court exercises its
supremacy over issues in which uniformity is needed. Therefore, the states
face the struggle of defining the boundaries of a state constitutional right of
privacy. However, the state courts are the most appropriate places for this
struggle to occur. 93 As Justice Brandeis once noted in a dissenting opinion,
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."'
Establishing an independent and adequate state right to privacy also
promotes federalism by spurring activity in federal courts.' While litigants
seeking vindication of their privacy rights in state courts may reduce the
burden on the federal system, federal judges may begin to borrow from the
rationale of state constitutional privacy decisions.96 This activity promotes
the constitutional framers' intent of creating a double security of fundamental
interests with one system showing mutual respect for and dependence on the
other system's decisions.
This discussion presupposes that article I, section 10 of the South Carolina
Constitution provides an adequate and independent basis for a substantive right
of privacy decision. Only if the privacy provision truly supports the court's
decision will federal review not be necessary.' Invoking this section is
adequate because it legitimately rests upon an interpretation of the state
92. Some commentators also argue that state judges may be more willing to grant greater
privacy rights than federal judges. Because a privacy decision of the federal court implicates the
rights of citizens in many states, federal judges are more prone to receive criticism for judicial
activism. See, e.g., Paula A. Brantner, Note, Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination:
State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 512 (1992).
93. See Graebe, supra note 15, at 1200.
94. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
quoted in Graebe, supra note 15, at 1200.
95. See Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
1279, 1322-23 (1992).
96. See id.
97. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
19941
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constitution,9" and, unlike the federal Constitution, the state constitution
affirmatively guarantees a right to privacy. The state court need only ensure
that its decision is truly independent of federal policy and decisions. The state
court, therefore, may not wholly defer to federal decisions for its reasoning
because then it would appear that the decision rested on federal grounds,
making the decision subject to federal review. 9  Finally, to ensure the
preclusion of federal review, the state court must explicitly state that it is not
relying on federal precedent.' °°  This explicit statement that the South
Carolina decision rested on the privacy provision in the state constitution
assures that the courts likely will not run afoul of the Supremacy Clause.
V. CHALLENGING STATE ACTION
WITH THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
If a litigant raises article I, section 10 as an independent and adequate
state ground to extend the substantive right of privacy, a court must then face
the legitimacy of the privacy claim itself. This Part will analyze a potential
privacy claim and apply that analysis to a South Carolina statute subject to
attack on privacy grounds and to the right to die. Then, this Part will address
the possibility of placing the right to die within the purview of the state
constitution's right to privacy.
Most likely, South Carolina courts will adopt the substantive privacy
claim analysis already formulated by the federal system. In this analysis, the
court first must determine whether a fundamental privacy right exists in the
case.' 0' Second, the court must determine whether a compelling state
interest outweighs an individual's privacy interest and whether an invasion of
that privacy interest is narrowly drawn to achieve the state's interest.' °2
With this analysis in place, the following discussion considers the statute
mandating IflV testing for sex offenders, and the right to die.
98. See, e.g., Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965); Black v.
Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
99. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983) (emphasizing that the Court will
assume that a decision relied primarily on federal law unless expressly stated to the contrary).
100. Id. at 1041 (stating that if the state decision clearly indicates "bona fide separate,
adequate, and independent grounds," the Supreme Court will not undertake to review the
decision).
101. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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A. Mandatory HIV Testing for Convicted Sex Offenders Statute
One statute subject to an invasion of privacy claim is section 16-3-740 of
the South Carolina Code. l1 This section represents one legislative response
to the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) crisis. It mandates that
any person convicted of a crime involving sexual conduct, who exposed the
victim to blood or vaginal or seminal fluids, be tested for the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) that causes AIDS. The test may be adminis-
tered without the offender's consent, and the results may be disclosed to the
health authorities and the victim."° Because of the intrusive nature of this
forced blood test, an offender could challenge the statute as a violation of the
right of privacy in the South Carolina Constitution.5
To effectively challenge the statute, offenders must first show the court
that they have a fundamental privacy interest. The nonconsensual testing for
HIV implicates the private right to make an autonomous decision" 6 because
offenders are not free to decide if or when they want to face whether they
have a disease equivalent to a death sentence. 107 Not only must the offender
who tests positive for HIV face this traumatic reality unwillingly, but the
offender must then face the stigma and discrimination inherent in being labeled
HIV positive." 8 Finally, the offender faces another intrusion into privacy
when the results are released to the victim and placed in the offender's
permanent prison health record. 109
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
104. Id.
105. This Note will not address the more frequent, but rejected, challenge to similar statutes
based on the Fourth Amendment's unlawful search and seizure clause. See, e.g., People v.
Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574 (I11. 1992) (holding that a statute requiring convicted prostitutes to be
tested for HIV did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure); People v. Thomas, 529
N.Y.S.2d 429 (Co. Ct. 1988) (holding that it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to
subject a convicted rapist to an HIV test); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 847 P.2d 455 (Wash.
1993) (en bane) (holding that Washington's mandatory HIV testing statute for sex offenders did
not violate the Fourth Amendment). But see Paul H. MacDonald, Note, AIDS, Rape, and the
Fourth Amendment: Schemes for Mandatory AIDS Testing of Sex Offenders, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1607, 1632 (1990); Bernadette Pratt Sadler, Comment, When Rape Victims'Rights Meet Privacy
Rights: Mandatory HIV Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REv.
195, 210-12 (1992).
106. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 847 P.2d at 462-63 (holding that although the right of
privacy was implicated by the testing, the state's interest in notifying the victim was compelling,
and the means were narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
107. Johnettal. v. Municipal Court, 267 Cal. Rptr. 666, 679-80 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Doe
v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1988)).
108. Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for the HIV
Antibody: Balancing the Governmental Public Health Interests with the Individual's Privacy
Interest, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 327, 365-66 (1991).
109. Id. A prisoner may have a diminished expectation of privacy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
1994] 207
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The court then must balance these privacy interests against the state
interests in testing the offender. Only if the compelling state interests override
the privacy interests should the court declare the statute constitutional. The
state interests in requiring the testing of sex offenders for HIV are threefold:
to allay the fear of the victim, to prevent further transmission of the disease,
and to inform the victim to ensure proper medical treatment.
These interests are compelling, assuming that the mandatory testing meets
them. As many commentators have noted, however, mandatory HIV testing
generally does not serve the state interests. ' ° The problems inherent in the
testing procedure itself preclude the assumption that the state interests
outweigh the privacy interests.
First, the testing is not one hundred percent conclusive and accurate,
given the virus's latency period and the possibility of false results."'
Therefore, the test results may give either false hope or unnecessary anxiety
to the victim." '2 Unfortunately, the test results reveal nothing positive about
the victim's status, especially since the victim cannot be tested conclusively for
six months after exposure."' Second, a false negative could create a false
sense of security for the victim and increase the risk that the victim will
further transmit the disease." 4 Third, the medication available to HIV-
positive persons will not benefit the victim more when the offender was tested
than six months after the exposure," 5 when the victim could be tested
conclusively. "1
6
U.S. 517 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). But see Sadler, supra note 106, at 207
(arguing that these cases should not apply to the mandatory testing of rapists "because the
government's compelling interest in institutional security, which formed the basis for the prison
cases, does not apply when the purpose of the [testing] is to benefit the victim rather than protect
the prison population" (footnotes omitted)). The testing still must serve the state's compelling
interest and outweigh the diminished privacy interest.
110. See e.g., Eisenstat, supra note 108, at 358-60.
111. See Sadler, supra note 105, at 198-99 (discussing the unreliability of HIV testing).
112. See id. at 211.
113. The HIV test is a misnomer because the tests now available do not test for the HIV
infection, but detect the presence of antibodies that develop to fight the HIV infection. The HIV-
infected person may not develop antibodies to the virus for several weeks or even months after
infection, and sometimes these antibodies never develop. See MacDonald, supra note 105, at
1615.
114. E.g., Eisenstat, supra note 108, at 358.
115. See id. at 360. Medication such as AZT is used primarily to prevent the appearance of
symptoms or delay the progression of symptoms. Additionally, medical evidence does not show
that AZT is more effective if administered to an infected person within two weeks, as opposed
to six months, after exposure. AZT should be administered prior to the appearance of symptoms,
but usually symptoms will not develop for years after exposure. Id. (footnotes omitted).
116. Notably, because the statute requires conviction, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-740 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993), the victim could be tested more accurately then because the time it takes to
secure most convictions will at least equal the latency period of the virus. Given this fact alone,
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Because of these medical fallacies inherent in serving the state's interests,
the court should respect the privacy interests of the offender and strike down
the statute as a violation of the offender's right to privacy. However, it still
is doubtful that a constitutional privacy challenge to the statute would be
successful. The hysteria and fear caused by the AIDS epidemic do not make
a court's decision any easier. The simple truth of the situation has been
succinctly stated as follows:
Invasions of privacy of people charged with or convicted of crimes,
especially if sanctioned by the legislature, are unlikely to be overturned by
courts, even if the measures serve no real public health purpose. The
people being tested are widely despised, while the people for whose
supposed benefit the testing is being done - like rape survivors. .. - excite
compassion. . . . Unfortunately, legislators are much quicker to impose
mandatory testing and disclosure than to appropriate funds for HIV
counseling for people who have been assaulted ....
Ultimately, it is difficult to predict the outcome of a challenge to the
statute in South Carolina when the court balances a sex offender's privacy
interest and the state's interests coupled with the victim's interests and
concerns. But if the nonconsensual testing of a convicted offender does not
sufficiently allay the fears of the victim, prevent further transmission of the
disease, or become useful in a medical diagnosis for the victim, then the
testing is an unjustified intrusion into the offender's privacy. Indeed, testing
the victim would serve the same interests more effectively. Therefore, section
16-3-740 properly is subject to attack on state constitutional right-to-privacy
grounds.
B. The Right to Die Controversy
The decision of a terminally ill patient to forego life-sustaining treatment
has been the subject of much debate in recent years. The right-to-die issue
arises in a variety of different circumstances, ranging from the more easily
answered inquiry of whether a state must honor a living will to the more
controversial inquiry of whether a state must allow assisted suicide.
In 1990 the United States Supreme Court addressed this issue, but not on
privacy grounds, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.18
Nancy Cruzsuffered severe brain damage in an automobile accident and had
the three state interests in mandating an HIV test for sex offenders are served by the less intrusive
means of testing the victim, not the unconsenting offender.
117. Scott Burris, Testing, Disclosure, and the Right to Privacy, in AIDS LAW TODAY 115,
128 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
118. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (5-4 decision).
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been in a "persistent vegetative state""1 9 since 1983 with virtually no chance
of becoming conscious again. Cruzan was kept alive by a feeding and
hydration tube implanted in her stomach. Her parents sought a court order to
remove this tube, which would result in her death. 2 ' The Court recognized
that a competent adult has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in not
being forced to undergo unwanted medical procedures.' However, relying
on the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of its living will statute,
22
the Court denied permission to remove the feeding tube because it found that
the Cruzans could not provide "clear and convincing" evidence that Nancy
would want the tube removed if she were competent to make that deci-
sion. l
The majority decision turned primarily on whether the Missouri statute's
heightened requirement that a guardian show the intent of the incompetent
patient by clear and convincing evidence unconstitutionally burdened the
patient's liberty interest. The Court recognized this liberty interest based on
the Fourteenth Amendment, not on right to privacy grounds.124 The Court
held only that (1) a competent adult has a liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment'25 and (2) an incompetent adult's liberty interest is not unconstitu-
tionally impinged if the state requires clear and convincing evidence that the
patient would refuse the treatment if competent before it will allow termination
of medical treatment.
26
The scope of protection of an incompetent person's liberty interest in
refusing medical treatment remained wholly undefined. However, Justice
O'Connor suggested that the states should define this protection, 27 thereby
leaving open the opportunity to recognize a privacy interest in refusing
medical treatment in the state constitution. 2 The Florida Supreme Court
119. Id. at 266. The Court defined a persistent vegetative state as "a condition in which a
person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function." Id.
120. Id. at 266-68.
121. Id. at 278.
122. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268-69.
123. Id. at 285.
124. See id. at 279 n.7 ("Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment
is encompassed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We
believe this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest." (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Id. at 282-83.
127. See id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Today we decide only that one State's
practice does not violate the Constitution; the more challenging task of crafting appropriate
procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States." (citation omitted)).
128. Before Cruzan a few state courts already recognized as a privacy right the right to refuse
medical treatment. E.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64 (N.J.) (holding that a patient has
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accepted this implicit invitation in In re Guardianship of Browning.129 The
court discussed privacy as "a fundamental right of self-determination subject
only to the state's compelling and overriding interest."130 The state
constitution explicitly provided for this privacy right, 31 and the court
acknowledged that a competent individual has a constitutional right to make
all medical choices under this privacy provision. 13  The court held that a
person's becoming incompetent does not diminish or negate this right.
33
Instead, a surrogate could exercise the person's constitutional right to refuse
treatment upon clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent, absent a
compelling state interest, which the court did not find.'34 In this particular
case, the patient had expressly authorized the termination of life-sustaining
procedures, including nutrition and hydration, if she became terminally ill.




If South Carolina courts apply the substantive privacy analysis to the right
to die issue, the courts first must recognize that a person's privacy interests are
a constitutional privacy right to be free from unwanted medical intervention under the state and
federal constitutions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Other courts ground the right to refuse medical treatment in the common law, see, e.g., In
re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989) ("[B]ecause a physician must obtain
consent from a patient prior to initiating medical treatment, it is logical that the patient has a
common law right to withhold consent and thus refuse treatment."); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d
947, 951 (Me. 1987) ("The personal right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is now firmly
anchored in the common law doctrine of informed consent, which requires the patient's informed
consent to the administration of any medical care." (citations omitted)), and statutory law, see,
e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (recognizing that
Missouri's living will statute permits competent persons to express their intent to refuse life-
prolonging procedures once they become terminally ill and incompetent in contravention to the
state's strong policy of favoring life), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). However, this article deals only with the constitutional recognition
of this right.
129. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
130. Id. at 9-10.
131. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
132. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
133. Id. at 12. The court also held that the right is not qualified further depending upon the
"denomination of a medical procedure as major or minor, ordinary or extraordinary, life-
prolonging, life-maintaining, life-sustaining, or otherwise." 1d. at 11 n.6.
134. ld. at 13-14. Courts generally will honor the substituted judgment of a surrogate or
guardian in cases involving incompetent patients with clear evidence of the patients' intent.
However, the right to die becomes increasingly more complicated when the incompetent patient
never was competent or did not provide clear evidence of intent while competent. See generally
Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in the Laboratory
of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1278-95 (1991) (discussing case law that defines the
standards and procedures used to exercise the right to die in a variety of factual contexts).
135. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13.
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implicated in the decision of whether to accept medical treatment. Because the
concept of privacy encompasses procreation, contraception, marriage, and
abortion, 3 6 it may also encompass the right to control one's own medical
treatment. Indeed, the right to control one's medical treatment has roots in the
common law. 37 Several states already recognize the right to refuse treat-
ment as a privacy right, relying on privacy or similar provisions in their
constitutions.'3
Next, the courts must determine whether any compelling state interests
outweigh the person's recognized privacy right. The means used to carry out
those interests must be narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible
to protect the privacy right. Such interests may include "the preservation of
life, the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 3 9 The court
in In re Browning discussed each of these interests and determined that the
patient's privacy interest outweighed the state interests. 140
Once courts determine that a privacy interest exists and that state interests
do not override it, they then must face the difficult issue of formulating the
procedures and standards used in implementing the right to die. Fortunately,
there is a rich body of case law aid statutory interpretations from other states
in this area. 141 However, some disparity in the procedures and standards
exists among the states. South Carolina must consider issues such as what
type of evidence is admissible to determine an incompetent's intent, what
weight the court should give to the evidence, and what role the court should
play in a surrogate or guardian's decision to terminate an incompetent's
medical treatment.
136. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 128.
138. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (en bane); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977); In re Welfare of Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
139. See Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14.
140. Id. First, the court discounted the state's interest in preservation of life because the
patient's condition was incurable. Therefore, the patient's right to refuse treatment outweighed
this state interest. Second, the court found the third party interest inapplicable. Third, the
interest in suicide prevention was without merit because the patient would die from natural causes
upon discontinuationof life support. Finally, the court found the state interest of maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession alone insufficient to override the constitutional right
of privacy. Id. But see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1990) (holding that a prisoner who wanted to starve himself to death could be treated
involuntarily because the state's interest in the orderly administration of its prisons outweighed
the prisoner's diminished right to privacy).
141. For an excellent overview of cases that discuss the issues arising from the recognition of
the right to die in the state laboratory, see Eaton & Larson, supra note 134.
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The state legislature has not been silent on this issue. South Carolina has
enacted the Death With Dignity Act'42 that essentially provides for the
citizens of the state to execute living wills. However, this act does not allow
the removal of a nutrition and hydration tube without express prior authoriza-
tion by the incompetent.'43 Also, any declaration under the act is ineffective
during the course of a woman's pregnancy. 14 It remains for the courts to
decide whether the constitution permits these prohibitions. Further, the courts
must decide whether expression of a living will under this act will be the only
evidence used to determine the intent of an incompetent.
While South Carolina courts have yet to address the basic issue of
whether the right to die should be a constitutionally protected privacy right,
other state courts are addressing far more controversial issues. For example,
California had to address whether a person had a constitutional right to the
premortem cryogenic suspension of his body. In Donaldson v. Van de
Kamp, 45 the plaintiff Thomas Donaldson, who was suffering from a brain
tumor that would result in his persistent vegetative state and death, wanted to
be frozen before his death, hoping for future reanimation. 46 Recognizing
first that Donaldson had a constitutional privacy right to refuse medical
treatment, the court found that Donaldson's request ultimately was an assisted
suicide. The court held that the state interests in protecting society against
abuses and in enforcing the criminal law prohibiting assisted suicide substan-
tially outweighed Donaldson's privacy interest." Therefore, the court
affirmed the dismissal of Donaldson's request. 1
48
Also, Michigan is considering the well-publicized case of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian and his "'suicide machine,"' a device that permits a person to
intravenously inject anesthetic and a fatal dose of potassium chloride. 49
Michigan charged Kevorkian with violating a Michigan statute that made it a
felony to assist in another person's suicide. The Michigan Circuit Court
recently declared this statute impermissibly overbroad because it unconstitu-
tionally restricted a terminally ill person's liberty interest in committing
rational suicide.' The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
142. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
143. See id. § 44-77-20(2).
144. Id. § 44-77-70.
145. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Ct. App. 1992).
146. Id. at 60-61.
147. Id. at 62-63.
148. Id. at 60.
149. Edward R. Grant & Cathleen A. Cleaver, A Line Less Reasonable: Cruzan and the
Looming Debate overActive Euthanasia, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 99, 230-31 (1991).
150. People v. Kevorkian, 62 U.S.L.W. 2411 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Dec. 13, 1993), rev'dsub nom.
Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994), appeal granted, No. _,
(Mich. June 6, 1994). Although the Supreme Court distinguished between taking active and
1994]
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court's declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality, but held that the right
to commit rational suicide is not constitutionally protected.'
The ight-to-die issue implicates a variety of difficult questions and
disparate circumstances that probably can be answered only by weighing an
individual's privacy right against the state interests. The South Carolina state
court may be willing to expand privacy rights to encompass the right to die
because it expressly recognizes a right to privacy in the state constitution. If
this right is recognized as a state constitutional right, any decision to terminate
medical treatment of a patient will be precluded from federal review. 52
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note detailed the importance of Singleton and its recognition of a
substantive right of privacy in the South Carolina Constitution. Challenges to
state action that unreasonably intrude upon a citizen's right to privacy may
become insulated from federal review on the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine. These challenge may include the statute mandating HIV
testing for sex offenders and may establish the right to die as a privacy right
under the South Carolina Constitution. Even if these particular challenges fall
short, they will develop state constitutional privacy law and begin to provide
a basis for future challenges. In particular, the equally troublesome cases
dealing with the homeless, the sodomy statute, the right to assisted suicide, the
right of homosexuals to adopt, the rights of surrogate mothers, and cryo-
genetics represent areas of autonomous decisions which may be better dealt
with in the laboratory of the state courts, expounding their own state
constitutions. As one commentator pointed out, "Privacy... rarely has come
to those who have not actively sought it."' 53
passive steps to terminate life in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990), Justice Scalia argued that any such distinction would not make sense and that neither
form should be a protected liberty interest. Id. at 297-98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151. See Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 492-94.
152. See supra part III.
153. Gormley & Hartman, supra note 97, at 1323.
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